Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.     

结构性去杠杆下的中国宏观经济*——2018年中期中国宏观经济分析与预测

2018年以来中国经济平稳运行，物价水平稳定，就业形势整体向好，经济增长质量稳步提升。不过，当前中国经济仍然面临一定的下行压力，尤其需要警惕消费增速过快下滑、宏观税负进一步加重、民间投资复苏乏力、部分企业效益状况显著恶化、去杠杆过程中金融体系不稳定性加剧等主要风险点。此外，杠杆率高企是现阶段中国经济面临的突出问题，而且中国的杠杆率在不同部门之间以及各部门内部均体现出明显的结构性特点。为此，中央在2018年专门提出了“结构性去杠杆”的新思路。在“结构性去杠杆”稳步推进的大背景下，宏观政策既要积极应对经济下行压力，谨防去杠杆带来的经济增速超预期下滑风险，又要激发经济内生增长动力，促使经济实现长期可持续发展和“高质量发展”。     

地方政府债务对工业资本配置效率的非线性影响效应——基于动态面板平滑转换回归PSTR模型的检验

经济新常态下,提高工业资本等要素配置效率是实现经济向高质量增长转变的必然要求。本文在政府主导、投资驱动的工业发展模式下,结合地方债务压力和金融发展差异门限变量,在非线性框架下运用动态面板平滑转换回归模型实证检验地方债务规模与工业资本配置效率的渐进演变关系。研究发现,适度的地方债务规模有助于提高资本配置效率,但随着债务压力增加,举债对资本配置的正效应逐步减弱并产生负效应。究其原因,适度举债能补齐工业基础设施短板,压低土地成本,对工业发展产生杠杆效应,从而提高资本配置效率;但过度举债推升财政风险,占用信贷资源并强化企业融资约束,造成资本配置低效率。此外,研究发现,地方信贷规模提升,能缓解举债的融资约束,促进工业行业间的资本流动;而工业金融深化程度提高,能增强市场竞争机制在要素配置中的作用,缓解举债造成投资错配,从而增强资本配置效率。以上分析结果表明,地方政府举债应更理性、适度、规范。     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

Reelection,growth and public debt

In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt.     

Macroeconomic policy cooperation and the G20

Has the G20 achieved its goals in macroeconomic cooperation since 2008? The paper organises the G20's efforts under five themes: macroeconomic stimulus, fiscal consolidation, monetary policy, the global financial safety net and global imbalances. The G20 was initially successful in each of these areas, but this success was short‐lived. While the G20 met its goals on macroeconomic stimulus, it has been less successful in reducing deficits and debt. While it was successful in increasing its resources, the global financial safety net remains too small, too fragmented and institutional reform is incomplete. While the G20 succeeded in moving to more market‐determined exchange rates and avoiding competitive devaluations, it struggled to avoid negative spillovers. Despite years of effort, the G20 has made limited progress in reducing global imbalances. Current account imbalances are creeping back to pre‐crisis levels. Public debt remains high and most economies are moving in the wrong direction in correcting imbalances in household savings and debt. The paper concludes that the G20 has done better in some areas than others. But to suggest the G20 is a forum in decline ignores its shift from reactive crisis response to longer‐term structural challenges outside of the pressing need of an immediate crisis.     

基于经济阈值效应的地方政府举债压力弹性研究

地区所处经济阶段差异会使地方政府行为激励产生异质性,进而影响地区举债压力弹性。从经济阈值效应的独特视角,探究不同经济门槛区间压力波动引起的地方政府举债行为变化,利用举债压力弹性解释地方政府债务规模扩张成因。基于我国283个地级市数据,构建门槛面板模型对理论假设进行经验检验。研究发现:从低到高的经济阈值区间下地方政府举债压力弹性翻倍增长,尤其是在第三经济阈值区间,举债规模扩张呈现加速度特征;财政压力对地方政府举债的刺激作用,只有在第三经济阈值区间才会得以释放;“土地财政”的存在强化了地方政府举债对压力变化的敏感度,并助推了地方政府举债压力的弹性波动。经济处于发达阶段的地方政府的举债压力敏感度,显著高于处于欠发达阶段的地方政府,因此,高水平的城市举债压力弹性及其潜在的债务风险应成为下一步关注的焦点。     

上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应——基于委托代理问题视角的实证研究

现金股利发放反映了债权人、股东、管理者之间的利益分配关系,现金股利的价值效应受到委托代理问题的影响。采用2008—2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在委托代理理论的分析框架下实证检验我国上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应。研究表明,发放现金股利可能会损害债权人利益,过度债务公司发放现金股利的价值效应较小,而债务不足公司发放现金股利的价值效应较大。基于管理者代理问题视角的研究发现,现金股利可以有效发挥降低管理者代理成本的作用,当管理者代理问题严重时公司发放现金股利的价值效应更大。基于控股股东代理问题视角的实证结果表明,现金股利可以作为替代性的治理机制约束控股股东行为,当控股股东代理问题严重时现金股利具有更高的价值效应。     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

Policy Dimensions of Progressive Institutional Change: Lessons from China’s Construction of a Socialist Market Economy

Abstract:

Through a comprehensive review of the progressive institutional change (PIC) literature, I first discuss four possible trajectories of PIC by considering the forces of societal reaction that might frame the path, as well as the scale and scope of the changes. Thus, I pose four questions that need to be asked when related policies are formulated for PIC. To illustrate this method, I scrutinize the evidence from the construction of a socialist market economy by the Chinese government since the 1980s and argue that related policies have successfully promoted PIC from three dimensions: (1) curbing potential conflicts with power groups; (2) promoting a sense of awareness among stakeholders; and (3) minimizing disturbances to the community. Actually, the related changes demonstrate a dynamic “displacement process” for PICs. Despite the success of this sociosystem, it is found that the sustaining of PIC which requires policy factors that enhance instrumental efficiency in the Chinese context will serve as a challenge to the Chinese government ahead.